Resource allocation decisions are crucial for the success of an organization. This paper proposes an integrated approach to resource allocation problems, in which decision makers have one observation of the multiple input-output criteria of candidates. We offer important improvements over existing approaches based on the widely used data envelopment analysis (DEA), which has two major limitations in its application to resource allocation. First, traditional DEA models compute efficiency scores by optimizing firm-specific shadow prices of inputs and outputs. This could be problematic, because in practice stakeholders would usually require unanimously agreed-upon trade-offs among evaluation criteria. Second, previous allocation approaches based on DEA do not allow for controlling the risk exposure of allocation portfolios. To tackle these problems, we propose an efficiency measure based on equilibrium shadow prices of different criteria, and we use the bootstrap efficiency distributions to gather information regarding efficiency variations and correlations. Through our methodology, decision makers can obtain the risk-minimizing allocation portfolio. We illustrate the proposed approach through an empirical R&D project budgeting problem in which we allocate funding according to the projects efficiency distributions.
Introduction
Resource allocation has long been a key decision in almost all organizations. Allocation of resources among firms in an economy is also an important driving force for the industrial productivity growth. With the enormous investments and sunk costs contingent on the decision, the allocation decision making can create a long-term impact on the organizational performance. Fine (2000) further describes a firm's core competitive advantage as the ability to judiciously organize its resources in the value chain. In the new product development process, for example, managers have to determine the new product portfolio before competitors take up the market. Therefore, the product portfolio decision is usually made under great time pressure, and is determined based on estimations of the required resources and potential benefits of a new product line, such as projected production costs, market share, and profitability, among others (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987) .
From the general market theory in economics, complete and distortion-free market information should automatically guide resources to their optimal allocation (Srinivasan and Bhagwati 1978) . In this ideal situation, decision makers can rely on market signals to attain efficient allocation. In practice, however, price information can often be incomplete-this is especially true in today's changing market. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) find that in the high-velocity environment (e.g., the computer industry) market information can become inaccurate or obsolete soon after they come into existence. Moreover, markets for those allocation criteria might also be missing or malfunctioning; for example, it can be difficult to compare the relative value of environmental goods with that of commodities (e.g., Freeman 2003) . Especially when the evaluation process involves multiple input-output criteria, it could be a daunting task to properly manage resource allocation.
In the absence of price information, data envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been widely used to calculate the relative efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs) (Charnes et al. 1978 , Cooper et al. 2006 . In DEA, estimation of technical efficiency relies on an optimization procedure to determine the shadow prices of multiple input-output evaluation criteria (in DEA terminologies they are interchangeably called weights or multipliers). Specifically, the DEA model assumes that each evaluated DMU will select the 730 Operations Research 59(3), pp. 729-741, © 2011 INFORMS shadow prices that optimize its own efficiency score. In this sense, the optimal prices reflect the evaluated DMU's optimal choice concerning the unobservable market prices. Thus, the DEA efficiency scores for different DMUs are computed based on the firm-specific price estimations, and the evaluation process is not carried out according to a unified evaluation standard across all units. From the a central planner's standpoint, however, this is not entirely consistent with the planner's decision process when faced with uncertain shadow prices for inputs and outputs (e.g., Pesaran and Smith 1995) , and can also be problematic in the communication process with stakeholders.
Nevertheless, the advantage of requiring no prior price information makes DEA an appealing approach for resource allocation problems. Oral et al. (1991) and Liang et al. (2008) propose alternative DEA-based efficiency evaluation procedures to assess R&D project performance. In these two studies, the R&D budget is allocated according to a simple ranking of project efficiency, and the allocation decision is taken as an independent step from efficiency estimation. Another stream of studies incorporates allocation decision variables into the DEA formulation. Golany and Tamir (1995) propose a DEA-based allocation model. In their model they select the efficient input-output bundles that maximize the sum of outputs from all DMUs. Beasley (2003) and Cook and Zhu (2005) develop a fixedcost allocation approach based on the DEA formulation. They model the fixed cost as an additional input variable in the DEA model. Beasley allocates fixed costs such that the average efficiency of all DMUs can be maximized, whereas Cook and Zhu assume that the original efficiency scores of DMUs should remain unchanged after allocation. More recently, Chen et al. (2010) combine DEA and a specialized simulation algorithm to efficiently select a subset of superior operational policies for a warehouse from a large pool of available policy options.
Other researchers use DEA in conjunction with multiobjective programming approaches to increase the flexibility in allocation decisions. Athanassopoulos (1995) proposes a DEA-based allocation approach called the Go-DEA model. In this model, the goal programming approach is used to generate allocation targets; the final allocation is determined such that deviations from the targets can be minimized. Athanassopoulos (1998) similarly employs goal programming to derive allocation targets, but considers additional steps to ensure equity and operational efficiency of the solution. Korhonen and Syrjänen (2004) combine DEA with multiobjective linear programming to incorporate user preferences in allocation. In their model they assume that firms are able to slightly alter their input-output mix as a result of resource reallocation. Eilat et al. (2006) apply DEA with special weight restriction constraints to project evaluation problems.
Despite these efforts, we identify a critical gap between the current efficiency-measuring approaches and the resource allocation problem. First, approaches cited above all make use of nonunique shadow prices obtained from DEA or related models to compute efficiency. This feature indeed enables efficiency evaluation when prioritizing presumptions cannot be readily imposed. However, the DMU-specific weights do not permit the procedural justice stressed by organizational and social scientists, who recommend that the allocation procedure be consistent and representative of the opinion of different evaluated projects (Lind and Tyler 1988, Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001) . More specifically, stakeholders could oppose the allocation decision because there is no consistent evaluation standard. In this paper we assume that the equilibrium prices of inputs and output exist, albeit unknown to the central evaluator (Debreu 1951 , Kuosmanen et al. 2006 . Specifically, we model the shadow prices as random variables, and the DMU's efficiency is formulated as a function of the prices. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) also consider expected shadow prices an important component of the cross-functional decision making in the decentralized production system. Pesaran and Smith (1995) describe several applications of decision models based on expected shadow prices under uncertainty. Second, previous approaches do not consider the performance variation in determining the allocation. Controlling for the risk (i.e., uncertain outcomes) has been one of the most fundamental functions of resource allocation and project management (e.g., Cooper et al. 2002, p. 26; Elmaghraby 2005) . Indeed, without embedding a risk-mitigating mechanism in the allocation procedure, the allocation decision may by chance lead to unacceptably poor performance that will jeopardize the long-term sustainability for the organization. Graves and Ringuest (2003) also observe that making project selection decisions without considering the interproject relations is likely to result in dominated project portfolios.
In view of the above issues, this paper develops a novel methodology that exploits the primary advantage of the DEA model while simultaneously developing extensions to solve resource allocation problems. We first formulate the new efficiency index as a function of a unique set of stochastic shadow prices, and then develop a bootstrap algorithm to assess efficiency variations and correlations among the evaluated units. The bootstrap efficiency distributions are used to estimate parameters in the allocation model. Our objective in the resource allocation problem is to obtain an efficient allocation portfolio that is risk minimizing, given a specific requirement of the average portfolio efficiency.
The allocation approach that will be developed can be summarized in the four-step process in Figure 1 . In view of the uncertainty in shadow prices, we formulate the efficiency index in the first stage as a function of stochastic price variables ( §2). Specifically, the efficiency index is defined as the expected weighted ratio of outputs and inputs. Consequently, the index accounts for the uncertainty in prices and is distinct from the traditional DEA efficiency measure, which depends on deterministic and firm-dependent shadow prices. In the second stage, we estimate shadow prices using the observed input-output data. We model the pricing behavior among competing units as a noncorporative efficiency game from which we can obtain the unique equilibrium prices associated with different DMUs. The equilibrium prices are indicative of the relative importance of inputs and outputs, and are essential for the calculation of efficiency scores. Because of the uncertainty of shadow prices, the efficiency score is also subject to variability-which we consider as the source of risk in resource allocation. To assess this variability, we use the bootstrapping technique to approximate the sampling distributions of efficiencies under weight uncertainty ( §3); the approximated efficiency distributions also enable us to compute the sample statistics of efficiency scores. In the final stage, the ultimate allocation decision is determined through an optimization procedure that considers the mean and variance performance of the allocation portfolio ( §4). In §5 we provide an application of our approach to an empirical R&D project budgeting problem. In the remainder of the paper we will elaborate on each of these four components.
A Stochastic Efficiency Measure
Consider n DMUs that are under evaluation, and for the jth DMU, its m inputs and s outputs are denoted by real vectors X j = X j1 X jm and Y j = Y j1 Y js , respectively. In particular, resources or factors that one would wish to minimize are ideal candidates for input variables, whereas indicators of a desirable nature like sales and scientific contribution can be treated as output variables. Assuming that shadow prices attached to inputs and outputs are random variables, we define the efficiency index for DMU-j as
where r andˆ i denote the random variables of weights associated with input i and output r, respectively. Because E j is a function of r andˆ i , it is important to note that E j is a random variable conditional on X j and Y j .
Before we continue, we should discuss further some of the characteristics of the new efficiency index. The efficiency index, as defined by (1), is the expectation of usual efficiency indexes under the uncertainty of shadow prices. The randomness in our model arises from the uncertainty of shadow prices. From the central evaluator's viewpoint, the weights he/she might observe will depend on the DMUs in the sample, which we assume to be a random sample (see Banker 1993 and Simar and Wilson 1998 for a similar assumption). As such, the shadow prices observed by the central planner are endowed with certain probability distributions. Modeling shadow prices as random variables also come from the observation that markets for inputs and outputs are often not fully functioning, and therefore available market information could be subject to change. In other words, as the market situation changes (e.g., a new set of DMUs are observed), the evaluator would have different assessments of the value of shadow prices.
Because the efficiency index is the expected value of a ratio of random variables, one analytically appealing estimator for (1) is the ratio of the sample means of the numerator and denominator of (1):
where ˆ r and ˆ i are the size-n sample mean of r and i , respectively. In (2), tr andˆ ti denote tth sample point from the size n random samples of r andˆ i , respectively. In (2) we use the sample mean weights as the estimates of the expected input-output weights. It is interesting to note that because the firm-level prices are not always observable, average prices are often used as the measuring instrument for input-output prices in the efficiency analysis (e.g., Byrnes and Valdmanis 1994; Grosskopf et al. 1999; Färe et al. 2005; Foster et al. 2008; and Coelli et al. 2005, Chap. 5) . When markets for the input-output factors become efficient, prices, and hence the index (1), will converge to unique values, and the uncertainty of shadow prices will also vanish. However, Equation (2) will not necessarily converge to the same value as Equation (1). Specifically, despite its intuitive formulation for computational purposes, Equation (2) is normally not an unbiased estimator of (1) (Mullen 1967 , Tin 1965 . For now, it is sufficient to just bear this issue in mind. In the next section we will use bootstrap to approximate and account for the bias in the estimation of E j . Because (2) is also a function of random samples, we need to estimate the prices before we can compute the index. In the next section we present the computational procedure for this task.
DEA Formulations and Efficiency Evaluation
In the literature DEA has been extensively applied to evaluating the relative efficiency of firms without a priori price information. The input-oriented CCR efficiency is defined to be the optimal value of the fractional linear programming problem (Charnes et al. 1978) :
Problem (3) is called the multiplier DEA model in the literature because the decision variables are the multipliers attached to the input and output variables. The optimal value of ji and jr are exclusively used in the computation of the efficiency of DMU-j only and can be interpreted as the optimal shadow prices for DMU-j. Problem (3) is a fractional linear programming problem, and in practice it is often transformed into an equivalent LP by utilizing the Charnes-Cooper transformation (Charnes et al. 1978) . The objective function (3a) is a weighted ratio of output and input factors, which has its origin from the classical definition of efficiency. Constraint (3b) establishes the feasible space for the weight variables and ensures that the efficiency score is bounded between 0 and 1. DMUs that obtain an efficiency score of 1 are called efficient, and inefficient if less than 1. In other words, a DMU is efficient when there exists a nonnegative weight vector that makes its efficiency score equal to 1, whereas other DMUs' scores do not exceed 1. The objective value can also be interpreted as the extent to which the DMU can proportionately reduce its inputs given its current outputs.
The evaluation process completes after we repeatedly solve problem (3) for the n individual DMUs. We can obtain the optimal j , and ji and jr for all DMUs j, inputs i, and outputs r. As mentioned, in problem (3) some nonnegative weights ji s and jr s are chosen to maximize the evaluated DMU's efficiency. Therefore each unit can, and very likely may, obtain different optimal multiplier values.
As noted in Roll et al. (1991) , however, in some cases it may be considered unacceptable that the relative importance of the same input or output is represented by widely differing weights; for example, in the resource allocation problem concerning a diverse group of stakeholders of various backgrounds and preferences. Consequently, Roll et al. (1991) propose an approach using a common set of weights derived from the DEA multipliers. Other approaches have also been developed to limited the DEA multiplier's flexibility by imposing ad hoc constraints; for example, the cone ratio approach of Charnes et al. (1990) and the assurance region approach of Thompson et al. (1986) . In these weight restriction approaches, however, users need to specify precise bounds on weights beforehand, which is usually difficult in practice. In addition, the weight restriction approach only limits the range of weights, but the problem of inconsistent weights and evaluation standard still fundamentally persists. By contrast, we model the weights as random variables and incorporate them as a universal standard in our efficiency index (1). In so doing, we retain the strength of DEA, while resolving the nonunique multipliers problem in efficiency computations. DEA multipliers, in this case, can be perceived as the firm-specific view on the input-output markets.
We can further compare Equations (3a) with (1). Both indexes are weighted ratios of outputs and inputs. In (3a), however, the weights used by one DMU could be different from those used by another. Note that if we plug in any optimal multipliers obtained from model (3), the value of (1) will be bounded between 0 and 1, and by construction it will be less than or equal to j in (3a).
Resolving Nonuniqueness of Weights in DEA
As noted, the DEA efficiency is usually obtained by solving a linearized version of model (3). However, this linear problem is often degenerate. Thus, its optimal solution is nonunique, and depends on the optimization package used (Despotis 2002) . In this regard, Liang et al. (2008) model the weightgenerating process as a noncooperative game, where the evaluated units compete against each other by setting input and output weights to maximize their own efficiency. They define the efficiency index as (for DMU-1):
where jr and ji are shadow prices given by DMU-j. In this setting, each DMU's efficiency score is jointly determined by prices assigned by all DMUs in the sample. In other words, each DMU can attempt to lower other DMUs' efficiency scores by setting its preferred prices. Steps to implement the game efficiency model are described in Appendix B. Liang et al. (2008) show that the shadow prices in the efficiency game will converge to a Nash equilibrium state where all units have no further incentive to alter their proposed weights (and hence unique). More specifically, through the game efficiency model we can obtain a unique n-by-s + m matrix, given the observed input-output data:
where j = j1 jm j1 js T is the weight vector associated with DMU-j. The equilibrium prices can be viewed as a random realization of r ,ˆ i , from which we can obtain estimates of weight and efficiency statistics. The weight-setting strategic behavior in the game model also characterizes the typical relationship among units competing for limited resources in the resource allocation problem.
We should also highlight the connection between the game efficiency index (4) and the stochastic efficiency index (1) defined earlier: they are both intended to measure the average efficiency in consideration of the variability of shadow prices. In particular, observe that Equation (4) corresponds to the sample average of Equation (1), if all units agree on a unique set of shadow prices. Hence, we adopt the game efficiency approach to obtain the unique equilibrium weights for the calculation of efficiencies.
Having obtained the sample equilibrium weights, we can calculate the efficiency estimate as in Equation (2). Note again that the efficiency index (2) is a random variable, and therefore it is highly important to assess its variability before we make further use of the efficiency estimates. However, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to derive an analytical formulation for the variability of the efficiency measure. Bootstraps, in this regard, are a useful approach to explore the statistical properties of estimators based on one sample, which is the subject of the next section.
Developing the Bootstrap Algorithm
In this section we begin by briefly describing the bootstrap technique; we then proceed to develop the bootstrap algorithm for the efficiency index (1).
Bootstrap Preliminaries
The primary goal in statistical inference is to gain knowledge about parameters of the population of interest (denoted by F 0 ), and this is typically achieved by drawing a random sample from F 0 .
1 The inference also requires prior information about the sampling distribution of the estimator. The analytical tractability of sampling distributions, however, is conditional on both F 0 and the mathematical structure of the estimator. Therefore, only under specific assumptions on F 0 can we derive an analytical expression of the sampling distributions of certain estimators (e.g., normality assumption on F 0 ).
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The bootstrap approach is a collection of computational methods for approximating sampling distributions by resampling the observed sample. The approach can be used to numerically approximate sampling distributions that cannot be analytically represented. The bootstrap method is founded on the general assumption that the empirical distribution from a random sample contains all information implied by the underlying population. This allows us to draw bootstrap samples from the empirical distribution to approximate the sampling distribution of interest.
Formally, let x 1 x 2 x n be a random sample drawn from an unknown population F 0 , and g be the estimator of some parameter ; namely,
and g x 1 x 2 x n is an estimate of based on a sample of size n. We denote F 1 as the empirical distribution of x 1 x 2 x n , which is constructed by allocating 1/n probability mass to each x i in the random sample x 1 x n . Now let x * 1 x * 2 x * n represent a random sample drawn from F 1 , or in notational form,
Using the sample drawn from F 1 , we can construct the bootstrap distribution F 2 of the estimator g. The distribution F 2 represents an approximation to the sampling distribution conditional on F 1 . The above framework of bootstrapping relies on the condition that the relationship between F 1 and F 2 constitutes a close resemblance to that between F 0 and F 1 . Because we have full knowledge of the empirical distribution, we can use Monte Carlo simulation to generate F 2 , the bootstrap distribution of the estimator g. Efron and Tibshirani (1993) provide an excellent introduction to the bootstrap methodology. Hall (1992) gives a comprehensive theoretical treatment of the bootstrap theory.
Probability Model and the Bootstrap Algorithm
The efficiency index (1) is a function of stochastic weights. Therefore, the index can be characterized by a probability model. Next we describe the probability model used to develop the bootstrap algorithm for the efficiency index. Suppose n DMUs are randomly drawn from a technology set in n is the weight vectors from individual DMUs (c.f. Equation (5)). Applying to (2), we obtain a plug-in estimator of the efficiency index E j . The in the notation is meant to stress that the value of E j is contingent on . We use the realized value of to construct the empirical distribution F 1 . This can be done by assigning probability mass 1/n to the observed j . Given F 1 , we can use Monte Carlo simulation to generate bootstrap samples of weight vectors:
which can be used to calculate the bootstrap efficiency estimate E * 1 ˆ * E * n ˆ * . Repeating this procedure, we obtain the bootstrap distributions of E * j for all DMUs. Algorithm 1 (The bootstrap algorithm)
1. obtain the sample game-equilibrium weight vectors 1 2
n from X j Y j , j = 1 n. 2. for b = 1 to B do 3. for DMU j = 1 to n do 4.
sample with replacement from 1 2 n to obtain * b1 * b2 * bn . 5. obtain *
We summarize the above procedure in Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, we first compute the sample weight matrix using the previously described game efficiency model (e.g., Equation (5)). The weight matrix is used to construct the empirical weight distributions. In steps 2-7, we resample from the empirical distributions for B times and obtain the bootstrap efficiency distributions, where B is a userspecified parameter.
Finally, recall that in §2 we mentioned that E j is not an unbiased estimator of E j . The bootstrap algorithm just developed provides a way to estimate and correct the bias in efficiency estimation, which is given by
We can approximate Bias j by using the bootstrap estimate of E j (Efron and Tibshirani 1993) :
then, the bias-corrected estimator for E j is written as
We have introduced steps to generate bootstrap efficiency distributions, including a nonparametric approach to obtaining a unique set of sample weight estimates, as well as a bootstrap algorithm for the efficiency estimator. The bootstrap distributions per se, however, do not directly reveal the appropriate choice of allocation-we need a mechanism to transform the probabilistic content of the efficiency distributions into decision support information. In the next section, we show how to allocate resources while considering the mean and variance characteristics of efficiency distributions.
Allocation Using the Mean-Variance Model
The stochastic efficiency index that we defined earlier depends on random weights and is nondeterministic. The efficiency score may therefore exhibit fluctuations as a result of the stochastic uncertainty of shadow prices (i.e., changes and information update in the input and output markets). For example, a DMU may gain a higher expected efficiency score because weight distributions "on average" are in more favor of this DMU's input and output levels than others. High expected efficiencies can, however, be accompanied by substantial efficiency variations. Similarly, a DMU can also have a lower expected efficiency but more stable performance. Without considering these aspects, the allocation decision could result in portfolios with either low expected efficiencies or high variations in efficiencies. In light of these issues, our allocation model attempts to balance the trade-off between mean and variance of efficiency.
In this paper we adopt the mean-variance (MV) formulation, which was first proposed in the landmark paper by Markowitz (1952) . The MV formulation for resource allocation has been a classical model in financial portfolio management and optimization. The model receives its name from the combination of the two most important factors in investments: return and risk, and these two notions are proxied by the mean and variance of the return distribution of an investment portfolio. Markowitz and Todd (2000) further conclude that the MV model provides the maximum expected utility for most utility functions. Specifically, the optimal portfolio obtained from the mean-variance model is guaranteed to be nondominated if either the return distributions are elliptically symmetric, or decision makers have a concave quadratic utility function (see, e.g., Ingersoll 1987); we assume the latter condition. Steinbach (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the Markowitz model.
Ever since the Markowitz's model was proposed, researchers have proposed other alternative risk measures; for example, downside risk measures (Sortino and Van Der Meer 1991) , mean-absolute measures (Konno and Yamazaki 1991) , and the mean-variance-skewness model (Konno et al. 1993 , Briec et al. 2004 ); see Wang and Xia (2002) for a summarizing discussion. In this paper, we adopt the classic Markowitz MV formulation to characterize the trade-off between mean efficiency and efficiency variation; models using alternative risk measures can be similarly applied.
We generalize the concept of the MV model by utilizing efficiency distributions in place of return distributions. To construct a MV model, however, we need estimates of the mean vector and variance-covariance matrix of the efficiency distributions. The bootstrap method previously developed in this paper allows us to approximate efficiency distributions of R&D projects, from which we can estimate parameters necessary for the portfolio optimization problem.
Rationing of Multiple Inputs Requirements
The traditional portfolio optimization model concerns allocating a single kind of resource. Therefore, an auxiliary procedure is needed to transform our multi-input problem to a single-factor problem, which we will describe next.
Suppose we receive n project proposals and a fixed amount of multiple resources denoted by X = x 1 x m ∈ m + . These project proposals contain information about their resource requirements, denoted by Z j = z j1 z js ∈ s + , j = 1 n (e.g., funding, human resources, or machineries). Our allocation procedure proceeds as follows. For each proposal j, we first impute the "pseudo" resource requirement ratio j , such that j X is greater than Z j , and at least one input level in two vectors is equal; i.e., j X Z j whereas j X ≯ Z j , where ≯ are component-wise whose optimal value can be more conveniently obtained as max i z ji /x i . Hence, we obtain j = max i z ji /x i for DMU j = 1 to n. Through this procedure the resource requirement can be conveniently represented by the scalar j instead of vector Z j . As such, the total resource available can be similarly regarded as unity. This rationing procedure is in accordance with the assumption of proportional changes in resource consumption in the literature on efficiency measurement and production economics (e.g., Charnes et al. 1978 , Färe et al. 1994 , Cooper et al. 2006 ). Evidently, allocation as implemented via j will not always use up the available resources in full. The slack resources, namely the lump of unallocated resources, can be allocated by solving the allocation model again; this process repeats until at least one input is depleted. Note that we might be required to set the parameter to a lower value to make subsequent rounds of allocation feasible.
As an example for the rationing procedure, consider the hypothetical three-input example in Table 1 . For this problem we can obtain j ≈ 0 111. The maximum resource level that project j can receive will then be equal to 0 111 * X ≈ 5 55 4 995 11 1 . The residual resources from all DMUs can be lumped together and allocated in a new allocation problem. So, for example, if the decision maker approves project j's requirement in full, then project j's residual resources will be 0 111 * 50 45 100 − 3 5 6 ≈ +2 55 0 +5 1 for the three inputs.
Using Bootstrap Efficiency Estimates
Once the rationing procedure has been applied, we can model the allocation decision as a vector of decision variables p = p 1 p n T , where p j denotes the proportion of currently available resources allocated to unit j. Now denote to be the variance-covariance matrix of all project efficiencies and = E 1 E n T , and the efficiency of project j is E j . It then follows that the mean and variance of the efficiency of a portfolio p is given by
A rational decision maker will want the portfolio to be mean-efficiency maximizing for a given level of risk, and variance minimizing for a given level of mean efficiency. Therefore the mean-variance allocation problem can be formulated as
In the above problem, constraint (14b) states that the available funding needs to be used up completely. The parameter in (14c) represents the lowest mean efficiency of the allocation portfolio that the decision maker is willing to accept. Constraint (14c) is the demand constraint, where the j is the parameter obtained from the rationing procedure.
To solve model (14), we need to obtain estimates for the Ɛ and in the formulation. Based on the bootstrap efficiency distributions from Algorithm 1, we can obtain the bias-corrected E * 1 E * n and * as the estimates of Ɛ and , respectively. The i j component of * is given by
Because a single run of Algorithm 1 gives one bootstrap sample of * , we implement Algorithm 1 for B times and take the average as our estimate used in problem (14) . By doing so, we could also obtain a finer approximation of the mean efficiency using the B 2 bootstrap samples. Because * is positive semidefinite, problem (14) is a quadratic programming problem, and hence it can be solved efficiently (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004) . However, it is possible that p j in the optimized portfolio takes up only a small proportion of the required budget j , which is often infeasible in practice. To resolve this issue, we can impose a budgetary constraint such that for each project j selected, its requested budget has to be financed for at least l j % of its budget:
Simultaneously, we may also relax constraint (14b) to p T 1 n 1 to avoid infeasibility due to the budgetary constraint, although it may not always be necessary. Relaxation of the budget constraint will have a similar effect to having a risk-free project with no contribution to the portfolio efficiency. As a final point, we should also note that one may Operations Research 59(3), pp. 729-741, © 2011 INFORMS also impose the cardinality constraint, which regulates the numbers of projects selected; i.e., n j=1 y j = k where k n is a user-specified integer (17) With the addition of constraints (16) and (17), problem (14) becomes a mixed-integer quadratic problem, which is NP-hard (Jobst et al. 2001) . Using the branch-and-bound technique in conjunction with a quadratic programming algorithm, the problem considered here can usually be solved within a reasonable amount of time. See Bonami and Lejeunes (2009) and Bertsimas and Shioda (2009) for accelerated algorithms to related portfolio optimization problems. The optimal solution to problem (14) then represents the variance-minimizing allocation portfolio given the mean portfolio efficiency requirement .
Application: R&D Project Selection and Budgeting
Next we apply our integrated methodology to a real-world R&D budgeting problem in which a fixed amount of funding is to be appropriated to candidate projects. The data used were first presented in Oral et al. (1991) . This data set consists of proposals of 37 R&D projects regarding their required budgets and contributions of different kinds to the Turkish iron and steel industry. Specifically, the project evaluation is conducted based on six criteria: indirect economic contribution, direct economic contribution, social contribution, technical contribution, scientific contribution, and budget requirements. A group of experts are responsible for evaluating these projects, and the scores of contributions are given in a 0-100 scale. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the data; the full data are provided in Appendix A. The maximum budget available for the R&D program is 1,000 monetary units, whereas the total required budget amounts to 2,515.6 units. In the efficiency evaluation, the first five criteria are treated as outputs, whereas the budget is regarded as the only input. 
Computational Results
Using the game efficiency model, we obtain a unique matrix of weight estimates associated with the 37 projects and input-output variables. The sample mean weights are shown in Table 3 . The mean weights suggest that the direct economic contribution is considered the most important factor, followed by the scientific contribution. These weights estimated are necessary inputs to Algorithm 1 for the estimation of the mean efficiency and variancecovariance matrix of efficiencies. Following the suggestion provided by Hall (1992) to obtain a better coverage probability of confidence intervals, we set B to 500. In addition, the mean-efficiency parameter is set close to the maximally achievable value (∼0.65), which is estimated by replacing the objective function of model (14) with p T E * 1 E * n and changing the problem to a maximizing one.
We report the allocation results from the proposed and previous approaches in Table 4 . The first column contains the allocation portfolio obtained from Liang et al. (2008) , whereas the second column shows the allocation using the DEA model (3). The third and fourth columns list the allocation results from our proposed approach, but based on the 100% and 70% budgetary constraints. The portfolios in the first two columns are determined according to the ranking of projects' efficiency scores (from the highest to the lowest). Specifically, in this approach we make financing decisions sequentially for each project. At each step, if the remaining funding is insufficient to fully finance the next project in the sequence, we skip that project and continue going down the list until either finding a project whose budget can be fully covered or reaching the end of the list. In the bottom of the table we report the average efficiency and risk measure (i.e., the objective value of model (14)) corresponding to the allocation scheme.
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When comparing columns 1 and 2 with 3 and 4, we can see that considering the efficiency variation and interproject relationship can lead to differences in the allocation results. Evidently, our approach produces portfolios that have a similar average efficiency but much lower risk, compared to the two portfolios generated using the static efficiency measuring approaches (see the last two rows in Table 4 ). If the model with a 100% budgetary constraint is used, the obtained portfolio will lead to an average of 33% reduction of the risk exposure than that of the static allocation approaches; the reduction in the risk measure can reach 41% if we relax the budgetary constraint to 70%.
In addition, these previous approaches considered here can only make binary selections and do not allow consideration of the performance of the portfolio as a whole. Our approach can allocate budgets to optimize the mean-variance performance of project portfolios. In terms of the l i parameter in formulation (14), previous allocation approaches based on DEA assume that the budgeter is required to finance selected projects in full (i.e., 100%), or equivalently, the task is only about project "selections." Therefore, if the 100% rule is indeed enforced, these approaches may seem straightforward and more reasonable. However, if the budgetary rule is relaxed (as in our case), the allocation method based on point estimates of efficiency scores will break down, regardless of which efficiency model is used. As such, these existing approaches are unable to diversify resources to mitigate risks in the selection process. On the contrary, our approach is applicable to both cases. By relaxing the budgetary constraint from 100% to 70% for all projects, we can obtain allocation portfolios that are superior in risk minimization and flexibility (i.e., we can obtain fractional portfolios that have a lower risk profile).
Sensitivity Analysis
The optimized portfolio obtained from model (14) may depend on the mean-efficiency parameter and the budgetary constraints (16) . We next analyze the allocation portfolios under four budget-constrained scenarios: 0%, 50%, 70%, and 100% constrained. The mean-efficiency parameter takes the value of 100 evenly divided points between the estimated minimal and maximal-mean efficiency values of the portfolio. 4 Specifically, Figure 2 depicts the mean and standard deviation of optimal portfolios under different mean-efficiency values and budgetary constraints. Allocation/project Figure 3 shows the optimal objective value, which represents the risk level of a portfolio, of the allocation result under the above four budgetary settings.
These figures reveal interesting observations of the effect of parameter specifications on portfolio performance. Figure 2 summarizes the effect of these parameters on the resource utilization (i.e., % of the total funding utilized). In terms of allocation quantities, Figure 2(a) shows that the first three series clearly have lower resource utilization than the 100% series for < 0 55. From the average allocation levels shown in Figure 2 (a), we can see that the 0% portfolios have slightly higher utilization than the "50%" and "70%" ones. The additional flexibility in allocation associated with the "0%" model helps diversify the allocation and reduce risk exposure. This is also illustrated in Figures 2(a) , 2(b), and 3, in which the mean-variance frontier of the "0%" model dominates those of other models. Specifically, the nonconstrained allocation model offers lower risk exposure under different mean-efficiency parameters in our analysis.
As expected, the total utilization of funding becomes more unevenly distributed among projects when stricter budgetary constraints are imposed (i.e., we see higher variations). However, differences in utilization begin to dwindle once the mean efficiency is set larger than the threshold near the 0.55 area. This is because the meanefficiency requirement necessitates at least a certain amount of investments of the total funding. We can also see that the paths of these series are quite different. For means and standard deviations of the portfolios, the 0% series is smooth, whereas the other three constrained portfolios are nonsmooth. In particular, the "50%" and especially "70%" portfolios exhibit a "zig-zag" pattern. This pattern occurs when the increased average efficiency parameter causes one project to be added or removed from the optimal portfolio. Figure 3 illustrates that the degree of strictness of the budgetary constraints is positively associated with the nonconvexity of the frontiers. In addition, stricter budgetary constraints can lead to increased risk exposure. This can be seen from the dominance relationship between meanvariance frontiers in Figure 3 . From the above analysis we can see the impact of the mean-efficiency parameter on the allocation portfolio, risk exposure, and resource utilization. Hence, decision makers should be deliberate on setting the budgetary rule because this may subtly affect both portfolio performance and practical feasibility of the optimal allocation decision.
Summary and Conclusion
The goal in resource allocation often relates to finding an efficient allocation portfolio that is value maximizing and risk minimizing. However, price information required for finding an efficient allocation portfolio is not always directly observable. In addition, to attain the best implementation result, it is vitally important that the allocation procedure should be regarded as equitable by all stakeholders.
In this paper, we propose an integrated approach to resource allocation problems. Our approach comprises nonparametric efficiency analysis, bootstrapping, and meanvariance optimization model. We model shadow prices of inputs and outputs as random variables. The efficiency score therefore represents a statistical estimator of the true efficiency. We draw on this statistical structure to develop the bootstrap algorithm for the efficiency index, which is used to substantiate the interrelationship among the efficiencies of evaluated units. Compared with previous allocation approaches using DEA, our approach is more flexible in that we allow the allocated resources to be less than the full requirement of a project. The proposed stochastic efficiency index also overcomes one limitation of DEA, that DMUs are evaluated by nonconsistent shadow prices. Another unique feature of our approach is that we consider the mean-variance performance of portfolios-so the portfolio can be optimized according to the planner's risk preferences. The sensitivity analysis reveals the potential effect of parameter settings in the allocation model, which can be a useful reference for users with different concerns about portfolio performance.
The current paper also contributes to the literature of efficiency measurement in several other ways. First, DEA has been criticized for its susceptibility to outliers and inability to handle statistical noise. Our analytical framework allows decision makers to analyze and tap into the statistical relationship among efficiency distributions. Second, our finding also provides an alternative viewpoint for the statistical analysis of DEA. Specifically, our approach is focused on the DEA multiplier model, where technical efficiency is defined as a weighted ratio of inputs and outputs. This can be contrasted with the statistical frameworks proposed by, for example, Banker (1993) , which considers the primal envelopment DEA model. Likewise, our bootstrap algorithm is developed based on a different concept from the one proposed by Simar and Wilson (1998) , whose line of thought is grounded on the envelopment model (Banker et al. 1984) . Third, in our efficiency index the weights attached to inputs and outputs are the averages of individual DMUs' optimal choices. From a practical standpoint, firms or project owners competing for resource allocations may therefore find our efficiency index, which utilizes consistent weight ratings for inputs and outputs, more acceptable and easier to understand. Finally, this paper presents one of the few studies that use DEA to carry out operation planning, instead of evaluating activities in retrospect. 
